Reframing Hume's Problem: Propositions as Interfaces in Case-Based Networks

Hume’s problem of induction is traditionally understood as a challenge to the logicaljustification of inductive inference. This paper does not propose a new justification ofinduction. Instead, it examines whether the problem itself arises from a representationalassumption about how propositions function in reasoning. Drawing on observations fromlegal reasoning and computational case-based systems, we suggest that propositions operateless as independently true universal statements and more as interfaces that mediate accessto stabilized clusters of past cases. Under this interpretation, what is commonly described asdeduction can be understood procedurally as case-based comparison via explicitly labeledinterfaces. We extend the legal case study by analyzing statutory e contrario reasoning:although often criticized as an invalid truth-functional inference (“if A then B” does notentail “if not A then not B”), e contrario is better understood as case-based exclusion in anapplicability regime rather than as the derivation of a new proposition. This perspectivereframes the classical formulation of Hume’s problem without appealing to additionaljustificatory principles.