Implementing the Pandemics Agreement: A Geopolitics Model

We analyzed 1) the compliance and implementation risks of the Pandemics Agreement; and 2) the policy options to deal with those risks. We considered several options: 1) US fully defect or re-engage (coalition of willling, bilateral); 2) China (lead, hedge or selectively engage); 3) WHO change its business model (from lead convenor, earmraked philantrophy, hybrid PPP); 4) how biopharma can align profit with access; 5) how can MDBs incentivize compliance. We then developed a geopolitics model to analyze the risks and mitigation options We model the preferences, salience and capabilities of pivotal actors (US, China, EU, Africa, LMIC, WHO, biopharma, MDB, global philantropies) with respect to treaty pillars (PABS, global supply chain and logistics and financing). We decompose the pillars in terms of aggregation technologies (how individual contributions add up) i.e. summation, weakest link, best shot, threshold) to understand the compliance and implementation risks. Full US re-entry to WHO with financial leadership produces the largest systemwide gains, raising compliance by roughly 30 percentage points across pillars. If the United States fully defects, a pandemic-dedicated US$10 billion-per-year MDB facility, paired with EU pooled procurement and time-bound IP flexibilities, delivers comparable financing gains. Regional manufacturing and regulatory hubs in Africa and ASEAN convert GSCL from weakest-link to best-shot configurations, with positive spillovers to PABS and financing. Philanthropic co-financing with MDBs amplifies limited grant resources, while diversified but transparent WHO funding improves predictability without sacrificing legitimacy.