Beyond Cognitive Bias: A Structural Reassessment of Rationality in Psychological Decision Models

Dominant psychological accounts of decision-making routinely interpret systematic deviations from normative rationality models as evidence of cognitive bias. This paper argues that such interpretations rest on a structurally fragile epistemic foundation. Rather than reflecting deficiencies in human reasoning, many so-called biases emerge from a misalignment between formal rationality standards and the ecological, temporal, and informational constraints under which real decisions are made. By reconstructing the bias paradigm as a fundamentally normative framework masquerading as descriptive psychology, the paper shows how model-dependent benchmarks are reified into psychological deficits.A structural reassessment of rationality is proposed, in which decision-making is understood as constraint satisfaction rather than optimization. To render this reassessment concrete, the paper develops illustrative reinterpretations of canonical bias phenomena, demonstrating how patterns commonly classified as irrational can be understood as context-sensitive responses to representational and informational constraints. Within this perspective, apparent irrationalities lose their default diagnostic status and instead reflect adaptive strategies under non-ideal decision conditions. The analysis carries implications for psychological practice, particularly for interventions aimed at debiasing, suggesting a shift from correcting individuals toward examining the structure of decision environments. The paper advances a conceptual reframing of rationality that preserves empirical findings while revising their prevailing interpretation. Keywords: cognitive bias, rationality, decision-making, normative models, epistemology of psychology, constraint-based reasoning