Why Consciousness Cannot Be Metaphysical: Evolutionary, Biological, and Linguistic Constraints

This paper argues that consciousness cannot be coherently understood as a metaphysical or non-biological phenomenon. Drawing on converging evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience, linguistics, and cognitive science, it demonstrates that consciousness degrades with neural damage and emerges gradually across evolutionary history, rather than appearing as an ontologically independent entity. The study shows that conscious experience is tightly constrained by biological organization: alterations in specific brain regions lead to predictable disruptions in memory, identity, perception, and self-awareness, while the evolution of increasingly complex nervous systems corresponds to progressively richer forms of consciousness. Human higher-order consciousness is further shaped by symbolic language, temporal abstraction, and narrative self-construction—capacities that are themselves biologically and evolutionarily grounded. By synthesizing evolutionary continuity, neurobiological dependency, and linguistic constraint, this work establishes consciousness as a biologically grounded phenomenon rather than a metaphysical one. This ontological clarification provides the necessary foundation for subsequent theoretical models addressing biological information processing, memory formation, and intergenerational transmission. The paper serves as the fourth installment in an ongoing theoretical series that includes the Epigenetic–Collective Consciousness Theory (EKB), the Karataş Protein–Personality Model (KPPM), and the Karataş Quantum–Consciousness Field Framework (KQCF). Rather than reiterating these models, the present work supplies the biological and conceptual groundwork that renders them internally coherent and scientifically plausible