A Critical Study of Kripke's Semantic Argument Against Descriptivism

Kripke’s semantic argument against Frege and Russell are much celebrated argument in the history of modern western philosophy. This paper/chapter is an attempt to critically evaluate Kripke’s position against descriptivism. In the third lecture of Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues descriptivist approach in case of terms of natural kinds like gold. He claims that a competent user of the term may refer the right referent. We can’t refer anything just by its physical property of “yellowness”. Now referring the right referent depends on the knowledge of the protons that the nucleus of its atom contains; and since it couldn’t be known a priori (being an empirical discovery), the Kripke’s position appears to be tenable. It shows that phenomenal properties are something that cannot be relied upon. In some possible world, gold might turn out to be an element that contains none of the phenomenal properties attributed to it; or conversely, some other substance might turn to contain all the phenomenal properties of gold. Both the cases are counterexamples to show the failure of the right reference. Nevertheless, the definite description refers to the unique referents as proper names or singular terms do. Hence, the positions of Frege and Russell vis-à-vis descriptivism can’t be rejected all at once. The descriptivism has its value to pick out a unique referent. However, it may fail in some counterfactual situations. This becomes the basis for Kripke’s arguments against the approaches of Frege and Russell.