Fiscal Sovereignty as a Measurement Domain: Residual Logic and the Citizen's Executive Right

Abstract: This paper addresses systemic inefficiencies and information asymmetries in centralized public good provision by proposing a novel mechanism: the Citizen’s Executive Right (CER). Traditional fiscal systems suffer from a "dispositional monopoly," where the state’s exclusive control over tax allocation severs the link between taxpayer preference and resource utility, leading to significant agency costs. The CER framework restores dispositional agency to individual citizens through Personal Public Accounts (PPAs) and a competitive market of Public Governance Organizations (PGOs).At the core of the mechanism is a temporal scarcity constraint—the "Rule of Lapsing"—which generates a systemic informational signal: the Total Lapsing Rate ($\Lambda_t$). This signal functions as a non-price auctioneer, aggregating decentralized preferences in real-time. Methodologically, we validate the mechanism through three layers:A formal extension of Walrasian General Equilibrium, proving that public sphere clearing ($\Lambda_t \to 0$) is a sufficient condition for private sector equilibrium;An Agent-Based Model (ABM) demonstrating that the CER functions as an endogenous automatic stabilizer, accelerating trust regeneration by 4.5 times during exogenous shocks;An empirical bridging analysis using philanthropic markets as proxies to validate the micro-foundations of "Wise Capital."This research provides a robust theoretical and computational foundation for transitioning from discretionary fiscal policy to self-regulating governance structures.Keywords: Mechanism Design; Information Asymmetry; Fiscal Federalism; Agent-Based Modeling; Philanthropic Proxies; General Equilibrium; Constitutional Economics.