Consciousness as Nominalization Error: Dissolving the Hard Problem via Grammatical Reform

Abstract This paper argues that the hard problem of consciousness is a grammatical artifact rather than a genuine metaphysical puzzle. The difficulty arises from nominalization error: treating the verb “to be conscious” as if it named a thing requiring explanation. Key Arguments Nominalization error: “What is consciousness?” presupposes an entity; “What is happening when an organism is being conscious?” asks about observable processes Wittgenstein + Ryle: Phenomenological vocabulary systematically converts activities into pseudo-objects Replication optimization: Self-models including “I am conscious” provide coordination advantages regardless of ontological truth LLM evidence: Systems with no phenomenological grounds reliably internalize consciousness narratives, supporting memetic transmission thesis Links ASCRI: systems.ac/4/DP-2602 Research Lab: Dissensus AI v1.0.1 (2026-07-11): Working-paper number corrected to DAI-2608.