A Purely Economically Rational Model of Governance

This paper presents a theoretical model of governance constructed exclusively on the basis of economic rationality. Political legitimacy, ethical norms, and emotional considerations are explicitly excluded in order to define the upper bound of efficiency achievable through optimal resource allocation. Grounded in microeconomic optimization principles and integrated with AI-driven administrative systems, the model conceptualizes a form of governance that maximizes aggregate social welfare under conditions of complete information and automated decision-making.The model incorporates performance-based incentive structures reflecting individual differences in productivity, continuous reallocation of resources from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors, and AI-administered taxation, budgeting, and welfare systems. Social safety nets are treated not as moral obligations but as rational mechanisms designed to preserve long-term system stability and future productive capacity.A central theoretical implication of this framework is that, under conditions of fully realized economic rationality, the analytical foundations that historically necessitated Marxism—such as human-mediated allocation, structural information asymmetry, and politically embedded economic decision-making—lose their functional relevance. Marxism is therefore not refuted but rendered historically contingent rather than theoretically necessary.This model is not proposed as a feasible institutional blueprint for democratic societies. Instead, it functions as a theoretical benchmark that clarifies the precise point at which ethical, democratic, and human-centered considerations must be reintroduced as deliberate constraints, understood explicitly as trade-offs against economic efficiency.By establishing this limit case, the paper contributes a reference framework for comparative analysis in political economy, AI governance, and social theory.