Pseudo-neutrality of EOE and the ideological presuppositions of naturalism and materialism

This paper analyses an epistemic paradigm I label EOE (Epistemic Empirical Objectivism), which functions in contemporary scientific discourse as a default frame of “neutral” cognition. I argue that EOE is not a worldview-neutral methodological formalism but a mechanism that conceals specific naturalistic and materialistic presuppositions introduced into science under the guise of epistemic self-evidence.I present a formal analysis of EOE’s internal inconsistency, deriving a performative contradiction from the tension between (i) EOE’s assumptions of observer neutrality, language transparency and independence of empirical data and (ii) minimal epistemic facts about the ineliminable role of the subject in observation, proposition formation and sense-making. I then show how institutional, methodological and rhetorical mechanisms reproduce epistemic materialism within EOE, favoring interpretive positions such as hard determinism (TD) without independent empirical justification. Finally, I outline a concise alternative — Minimal Epistemology (ME) — which reconceives language as constitutive of epistemic reality and reassigns the epistemic role of the physical to one among several domains of significance. The paper concludes with consequences for debates on emergence, agency, and scientific objectivity.