Russian Anti-Fascist Movement Within Russia as a Key Component of Ukraine's Resistance to Aggression

Abstract The material examines the opportunities for Ukraine, as the victim of the ongoing aggression by the Russian Federation, as well as for countries next in line for occupation by the Russian Federation, to enlist a broad range of resistance actors within the territory of the Russian Federation to counter the fascist regime established there. The technical possibilities of supplying resistance actors with such types of weapons as kits for assembling drones or ready-made compact drones are also considered. The possibility of local production of drones from components available on site and the use of such drones at their place of manufacture is likewise examined. As examples, the material considers the possibility of strikes by locally assembled drones against facilities of the fuel and energy complex (FEC), the possibility of long-term disabling of aviation infrastructure and aircraft, the possibility of stopping railway logistics of military cargo used to continue aggression against Ukraine within the commission of the crime under Article 353 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. It also notes the possibility of long-term disabling of electric power infrastructure using these solutions. The material presents methods of protection against the security threats under consideration to the Russian Federation, including attacks by the victim of aggression for the purpose of continuing an aggressive war. The material does not contain recommendations to the victim of aggression on restraining the actions of the aggressor, and exclusively shows what exactly the victim of aggression and in what way should not do for its self-defense, since this aggression against Ukraine has unconditional support from the current U.S. administration, in connection with which the author modestly supports the position of the United States—the world leader in democracy and human rights—regarding the right of the Russian Federation to destroy the civilian population and civilian infrastructure of Ukraine and the right of the Russian Federation to occupy Ukraine in violation of the UN Charter and UN resolutions. In the event that this material is used by the Ukrainian side to defend against aggression by the Russian Federation and to intensify hostilities on the territory of the Russian Federation, the author bears no responsibility, since, as stated above, the author is aware of the position of the highly respected U.S. administration for the next three years. No part of this material should be used to turn the “special military operation” (SMO) into a “special military defeat” (SMD).