Computation Without Ontological Substrate: Rendering, Representation, and the Limits of Algorithmic Explanation

Contemporary discourse in philosophy of science and information theory increasingly treats computation and information as ontologically fundamental, motivating claims associated with digital physics, computational universe models, and algorithmic explanations of reality. At the same time, computation and simulation achieve remarkable explanatory and predictive success across scientific domains, yet remain implementation-dependent, representation-bound, and structurally limited. This generates a tension between methodological effectiveness and ontological inflation. Despite extensive debate, there remains a lack of a coherent ontological framework explaining why computational practices succeed so robustly without licensing computational or informational ontology. This paper proposes that the Three-Circle Ontology provides a structural interpretation of computation as a rendered process governed by constraint satisfaction rather than as an ontological substrate. On this view, computational systems operate within structurally constrained representational domains and derive their power from alignment with relational constraints rather than from metaphysical fundamentality. The paper does not advance a new theory of computation, endorse digital metaphysics, defend pancomputationalism, or propose an ontology of artificial intelligence. Its primary contribution is to reframe computation and representation as structurally constrained renderings whose explanatory limits reflect ontological mediation rather than epistemic or methodological failure.