Combating Money Politics: Analysis of Electoral Law Enforcement Systems in South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia

This article examines the comparative legal frameworks governing money politics as an electoral crime in South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. Through systematic comparative analysis, this study evaluates the regulatory structures, enforcement mechanisms, and institutional arrangements that define each country's approach to combating electoral corruption. South Korea's Public Official Election Act and anticorruption amendments, including the Kim Young-ran Act, establish stringent legal boundaries with severe sanctions for electoral bribery and vote buying, supported by coordinated institutional enforcement involving police, prosecutors, and anticorruption commissions. Singapore's Parliamentary Elections Act, reinforced by the Prevention of Corruption Act, demonstrates operational effectiveness through centralized anti-corruption agency, transparent investigation procedures, and clearly articulated criminal sanctions. In contrast, Indonesia's electoral law enforcement remains fragmented across multiple institutions with limited deterrent capacity, reflecting predominantly formalistic and procedural approaches without comprehensive political and administrative accountability mechanisms. The fundamental differences lie not only in punishment structures but also in legal philosophy: South Korea conceptualizes money politics as a crime against popular sovereignty, Singapore integrates it within general anti-corruption framework as violation of public integrity, while Indonesia maintains narrow procedural interpretation. This study identifies critical gaps in Indonesian electoral governance and proposes reform strategies including strengthening constitutional independence of electoral bodies, adopting technology-based campaign finance monitoring, implementing multi-level sanctions, formalizing inter-agency coordination protocols, and developing anti-corruption legal culture through political education.