Lakrion Dormant Architecture (LDA): A Zero-Surface Security Model for Secure Messaging Applications
Abstract
Description The Lakrion Dormant Architecture (LDA) is a security architecture for secure messaging applications that keeps high-risk subsystems — such as voice calling, media processing, and other complex features — completely dormant during normal operation. Unlike conventional approaches where features are merely “disabled” in the user interface while code remains loaded and reachable, LDA ensures that dormant subsystems are not loaded into memory, expose no network listeners, and contribute no attack surface from the subsystem itself. LDA introduces four core design principles: (1) True Dormancy: Subsystem code is not linked, not loaded, and not reachable until explicitly activated, eliminating the always-loaded attack surface associated with real-time media features. (2) Mutual Consent Activation: Neither party can unilaterally cause code to load on the other party’s device; explicit agreement from both users is required before activation. (3) Time-Bounded Operation: Active sessions operate under a mandatory time limit (typically 5–30 minutes), after which the subsystem automatically deactivates, erases ephemeral cryptographic material, and returns to a dormant state. (4) Generalized Dormancy: The same pattern applies to other high-risk features beyond voice calls, including link previews, file previews, location sharing, and similar attack surfaces. LDA is designed to mitigate classes of zero-click exploits—such as those used by Pegasus-style surveillance tools—that rely on always-reachable code paths in messaging applications. This document describes a conceptual architecture and design specification rather than a concrete implementation. It is published under CC BY 4.0, and implementations are encouraged with attribution to the original author.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Security and Verification in Computing
Information and Cyber Security
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Publication date
- 16 January 2026
- Language
- EN