Formula-Constrained Economic Systems Without Governance Voting

This working paper examines formula-constrained economic systems as an alternative to voting-based governance in economic architecture. It analyzes the structural limitations of governance voting—such as participation asymmetry, capture, coercion, and long-term instability—and introduces verification-first coordination as a complementary design paradigm. The paper defines formula-constrained systems as architectures in which core economic behavior is specified ex ante through formal rules and validated through decentralized verification rather than discretionary governance. A time-based, non-monetary economic primitive is referenced as an analytical model to illustrate how participation and value attribution can be structured without voting or monetary issuance. This work is presented strictly as a research artifact. It does not propose an investment model, production deployment, or claims of economic efficacy. Its purpose is to invite critical examination of governance-free, formula-constrained architectures in economic system design.