The Emergency Fiscal Trap: Structural Negligence in Economic Governance A Zero Leap Theory Analysis of Taxation and Monetary Policy Under Emergency Powers

Emergency fiscal powers—temporary taxes, capital controls, monetary interventions, and debt instruments enacted during crises—exhibit a predictable failure mode: measures declared as temporary become permanent, structurally altering the relationship between citizen and state without adequate consent mechanisms. This paper applies Zero Leap Theory (ZLT) to demonstrate that fiscal consent operates as a structural constraint: a necessary permeability condition for legitimate economic intervention. When this gate closes—through coercion, opacity, or emergency bypass—no increase in enforcement intensity can substitute for its absence without generating structural resistance, capital flight, and systemic distrust. We analyze the constitutional principles governing fiscal consent (no taxation without representation, due process, proportionality) through ZLT's formal framework, demonstrating that these principles encode thermodynamically coherent constraints. We introduce the concept of Fiscal Negligence: a failure mode where emergency economic measures persist beyond their justifying conditions without sunset provisions, exit criteria, or independent monitoring. Historical analysis of the U.S. income tax (1913), the Nixon Shock (1971), and the Argentine Corralito (2001) validates ZLT's predictions. Finally, we provide the IAS-FISC Audit Protocol, a functional tool derived from the IAS Universal Protocol, to operationally assess structural negligence. "Version 1.1: Updated with full citation details for companion papers and refined audit protocol formatting."