The Unexperiencable Lock: Chalmers' Hard Problem and the Metalogical Identity It Cannot Experience

David Chalmers' "hard problem" (why physical processes give rise to experience at all?) and zombie argument expose the irreducibility of consciousness, challenging physicalism with conceivable beings physically identical yet experientially empty. This paper reveals the paradox: Chalmers' framework presupposes the Primordial Identity Lock — the unnegatable metalogical unity (A=A) enabling any stable experiencer, modal distinction across worlds, and coherent argumentation itself. Three theorems demonstrate the threefold dependence: (1) on a Lock for the unified subject of qualia, (2) on modal stability for conceiving zombies, and (3) on performative authorial identity for articulating the gap. Chalmers renders the Lock "unexperiencable" as brute fact — yet his own conceiving enacts its indivisible presence. The Ur-Matrix resolves the trilemma: experience is not a hard, unexplained gap, but radiant dependent emanation from primordial source.