On the Ontological Limits of Simulation Arguments Simulation as Representation, Not Substrate

On the Ontological Limits of Simulation Arguments Simulation as Representation, Not Substrate Author: Richard Lee Crowton Affiliation: Independent Researcher, ORCID: 0009-0003-6399-8744 This paper provides a conceptual clarification of simulation theory, focusing on the ontological assumptions underlying Nick Bostrom’s simulation trilemma. Rather than challenging the internal logic of the trilemma or proposing an alternative metaphysical framework, the paper identifies a category distinction that is often left implicit: the difference between simulations as representational tools and physical reality as ontological substrate. The analysis emphasizes standard scientific practice, in which simulations function as explanatory models validated by empirical observation rather than as candidates for reality itself. By clarifying this distinction, the paper constrains the scope of existential claims that can be coherently drawn from simulation arguments while preserving their philosophical interest. This work is intended as a foundational or conceptual note. It introduces no new physical theory, mathematical formalism, or empirical claims, and it is deliberately separated from the author’s other generative frameworks in cosmology, policy, governance, and engineering. 5. Keywords Simulation theory Ontology Scientific realism Philosophy of science Bostrom trilemma Epistemology Models and simulations