Existence and Enaction: A Critical Review of the Encounter between Existential Philosophy and Enactive Cognitive Science

This article critically reviews the encounter between selected existential philosophies and enactive approaches to cognition. “Classical existentialism” functions as a retrospective review category, while enactivism is treated through the influential but contested distinction among autonomy-centred, sensorimotor, and radical approaches. The review distinguishes documented influence, mediated reception, conceptual affinity, and explanatory integration across three principal routes: Merleau-Pontian embodiment, Heideggerian being-in-the-world mediated especially by Dreyfus, and Jonasian philosophical biology, within a broader Husserlian background. It then evaluates the encounter against three non-equivalent burdens: accounting for cognition directed toward absent, abstract, or counterfactual possibilities without prejudging whether its realization requires internal representational vehicles; explaining the diachronic development and synchronic constitution of the enculturated person; and relating the genesis and social institution of norms to their justificatory authority and criticizability. Contemporary work on affectivity, selfhood, social interaction, language, and psychiatry achieves substantial conceptual and clinical integration, but it does not yet yield a complete organism-to-person theory. As an adequacy framework rather than a completed derivation, the review proposes transformative continuity: later personal, linguistic, and norm-governed organizations remain embodied and developmentally continuous with living autonomy, introduce organizational, semantic, and justificatory novelty not exhaustively translatable into biological or dynamical vocabulary, and reciprocally reorganize their biological and sensorimotor conditions. This framework rejects both reductive deflation and unexplained discontinuity while leaving open the empirical and philosophical work needed to specify the transition. // 本文对若干存在哲学与生成认知进路之间的相遇作批判性述评。“经典存在主义”在此被用作一个回溯性的述评范畴;对于生成认知论,则依据自主性中心进路、感觉运动进路与激进进路这一颇具影响却也存在争议的区分加以处理。本文沿三条主要路径,在更广泛的胡塞尔式背景中,区分有文献依据的影响、经中介的接受、概念亲缘与解释性整合:梅洛-庞蒂式具身性、尤其经德雷福斯中介的海德格尔式在世存在,以及约纳斯式哲学生物学。继而,本文依据三项彼此不等价的负担来评价这场相遇:说明指向缺席、抽象或反事实可能性的认知,而不预断其实现是否需要内部表征载体;解释经文化濡化的人格主体的历时发展与共时构成;并说明规范的生成及其社会制度化同规范的证成权威与可批判性有何关系。当代关于情感性、自我性、社会互动、语言与精神病学的研究已经实现了实质性的概念整合与临床整合,却尚未形成一套完整的有机体—人格主体理论。作为一项理论适切性框架,而非已经完成的推导,本文提出转化性连续性:后来出现的人格主体组织、语言组织与受规范支配的组织仍然具有具身性,并在发展上与生命自主性保持连续;它们引入无法被穷尽地转译为生物学或动力系统词汇的组织性、语义性与证成性新异,同时又反过来重组自身的生物条件与感觉运动条件。这一框架既拒绝还原主义式的消解,也拒绝未经说明的断裂,同时把明确这一转变所需的实证研究与哲学工作留作开放任务。