The Influence of Lobbying and Electoral Financing in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Over the past century, the pharmaceutical industry has consolidated itself as one of the most powerful sectors of the global economy, exerting growing influence not only over scientific production and clinical practices, but also over the political and regulatory processes that shape health systems. Beyond the scientific and technological advances and socioeconomic transformations that have driven its expansion, critical scholarship has emphasized the adoption of structural mechanisms of corporate influence, among which lobbying and electoral financing occupy a central position. This scientific report analyzes, in a concise and didactic manner, how these practices operate within the pharmaceutical sector, with particular emphasis on the United States, where the availability of public databases enables the examination of historical patterns of political activity. Drawing on data related to lobbying expenditures, electoral contributions, and the circulation of actors between the public and private sectors, the analysis demonstrates the scale of financial investments, the existence of privileged access to decision-makers, and the cumulative effects of these strategies on public policies and regulatory processes. By linking these data to emblematic cases, such as the opioid crisis, the report shows that political influence in the pharmaceutical sector is not confined to isolated practices, but constitutes an institutionalized phenomenon with direct implications for collective health and democratic governance. Finally, it argues that understanding these dynamics is essential for strengthening public debate and for reflecting on mechanisms of transparency, regulation, and the containment of political capture in the health sector.