This Is Not Modality
Abstract
This short text argues that what is often treated as modality in contemporary logic, semantics, and AI-oriented philosophy does not concern possibility or necessity in the classical sense. Instead, it targets the structural condition in which such modal distinctions become readable, applicable, or enforceable at all. By refusing both modal gradation and probabilistic interpretation, the text marks a boundary: not a reinterpretation of modality, but a rejection of its applicability at this level. The aim is not to propose an alternative modal theory, but to suspend the framework in which modality appears as a meaningful explanatory tool.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Logic
Reasoning
and Knowledge
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Syntax
Semantics
Linguistic Variation
Publication details
- Journal / source
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
- Publication date
- 28 January 2026
- Language
- EN