Rules or Stories: Two Ways of Letting the World Appear at the Boundary of Science and the Humanities
Abstract
At the boundary of science and the humanities, contemporary thought is shaped by a persistent tension between two ways of approaching reality: as an unfolding of rules and as an unfolding story. Rule-based approaches, grounded in formalization, abstraction, and causal explanation, have enabled remarkable advances in scientific knowledge and technological control. Story-based approaches, characteristic of the humanities and phenomenological traditions, attend instead to lived experience, meaning, interpretation, and human agency. This article argues that these orientations are not merely competing methods, but distinct ways of letting the world appear, each revealing certain aspects of reality while concealing others. Drawing on philosophy of science, phenomenology, and the later work of Wittgenstein, the paper examines how this tension becomes especially pronounced in boundary disciplines such as economics, artificial intelligence, and the social sciences. Mathematical formalization is shown to bring rigor while simultaneously risking rigidity when extended beyond domains suited to stable and well-defined systems. Conversely, narrative and experiential approaches preserve meaning and possibility but risk relativism when detached from shared constraints. Rather than proposing a synthesis, the article argues that intellectual maturity lies in cultivating judgment—the capacity to move responsibly between rules and stories depending on context and stakes. The boundary between science and the humanities is thus presented not as a problem to be solved, but as a space of ongoing responsibility, where rigor and meaning must be held in productive tension.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Scientific and Historical Analyses
Philosophy
Science
and History
Interdisciplinary Studies: Technology
Society
and Humanities
Publication details
- Journal / source
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
- Publication date
- 30 January 2026
- Language
- EN