A General Objective Dichotomy: On the Structural Limits of Moral Authority

This paper investigates the conditions under which moral claims can possess binding authority rather than merely instrumental force. We distinguish between normativity arising from consequences, coordination, or survival, and categorical moral authority that purports to bind agents independently of their preferences or strategic aims. Through a sequence of eliminative arguments, we show that no derivation from physics, logic, agency, or practical reason alone can non-question-beggingly establish universal moral scope. In particular, we construct a formally consistent indexical moral agent—the Indexical Tyrant—whose value function is self-referential yet rationally coherent. This demonstrates that agency generates normativity but does not, by itself, fix moral universality. From this result we derive the General Objective Dichotomy: either (i) moral authority is grounded in a non-indexical objective axiom (moral realism), or (ii) value remains indexical, yielding a coherent but non-universal moral solipsism. No stable third position survives structural analysis. The paper does not argue for either horn of the dichotomy. Instead, it maps the logical boundary—the “moral wall”—at which justification ends and commitment begins. Consistent with this result, the paper adopts an invitational methodology: the structure is offered for inspection rather than coercion, allowing readers to locate their own commitments within the dichotomy. In this sense, the work aims to clarify the moral structure of reality, not to legislate it.