Epistemic Model of the Subject and an Objective Moral Basis

The article presents an epistemic model of the subject, built consistently from the perspective of a subject for whom that which is knowable constitutes itself through the assignment of meaning. A distinction is introduced between an internal perspective of a prescriptive nature and an external perspective of a descriptive nature, replacing the ambiguous categories of first- and third-personhood. The central element of the model is the concept of nomination, understood as the act of distinguishing and naming an element of experience within the subject's private language. Recognition enables the transition from direct experience to reflection and constitutes the conditions for meaningful discourse on intention, decision, and agency. In the second part of the article, it is demonstrated that the will—understood as the subject's capacity to make decisions independent of other subjects—is not a metaphysical postulate or an empirical hypothesis, but a necessary consequence of the adopted epistemic model. On this basis, the thesis is formulated that the subject's free will possesses an objective status in an epistemic sense and serves as the basis for interpersonal morality. The transition from description to normativity does not require an appeal to external ontological assumptions or "is-ought" derivations; instead, it results directly from the structure of nomination and the semantics of the will.