Lorentzian Admissibility

This paper establishes Lorentzian admissibility as a necessary boundary condition on empirical reference and physical description. It proves that admissible empirical claims about spacetime, dynamics, or measurement presuppose a Lorentzian structure at the level of reference fixation, independent of any particular physical theory, ontology, or dynamical law. The result is eliminative and modal. The paper does not derive Lorentz invariance as a contingent empirical regularity, nor does it defend a specific spacetime ontology or interpretive framework. Instead, it shows that non-Lorentzian reference schemes fail to preserve standing under admissible redescription: they permit illicit scope transport, reference drift, or surrogate substitution that undermines theory-level empirical confirmation. The analysis blocks a broad class of arguments that attempt to refute Lorentzian structure via empirical anomalies, alternative kinematics, or modified transformation rules. It demonstrates that such refutations implicitly rely on the very Lorentzian reference conditions they purport to reject, rendering them structurally incoherent rather than empirically decisive. This work is purely boundary-setting. It introduces no new primitives, no constructive models, and no operational or enforcement procedures. Its contribution is to delimit the space of admissible empirical reference in physics, clarifying why Lorentzian structure is not an optional hypothesis subject to experimental overturning, but a precondition for theory-level empirical intelligibility itself.