AA__1 Standing and Identity of Artificial Agents

This paper establishes a foundational impossibility result concerning identity in artificial systems. It proves that artificial agents cannot possess or preserve standing-bearing identity under admissibility, regardless of architectural continuity, memory persistence, learning capability, or behavioral coherence. The result is structural and eliminative. The paper does not propose criteria for artificial identity, nor does it assess specific system designs or architectures. Instead, it shows that any attribution of identity to an artificial agent relies on surrogate markers—such as functional similarity, parameter stability, narrative continuity, or social recognition—that fail to preserve standing. The analysis blocks a class of claims in which artificial systems are treated as persisting subjects capable of responsibility, authorship, or governance participation over time. It demonstrates that once admissibility is enforced, identity across artificial instantiations collapses into a descriptive convenience rather than a legitimate standing-preserving relation. This work is purely boundary-setting. It introduces no operational identity tests, no governance mechanisms, and no enforcement logic. Its contribution is to delimit what identity can legitimately mean in artificial systems, clarifying that standing-bearing identity is unavailable to artificial agents under any admissible interpretation.