Strongly Typing "Deep Utopia": Second-Order Science for Disambiguating Centralized and Decentralized Solved-World Futures

Recent discussions of "solved world" or post-scarcity futures often proceed as if such futures constitute a single, coherent scenario. This paper argues that this appearance of unity is misleading. The label commonly applied to such futures—exemplified by Nick Bostrom's Deep Utopia (2024)—in fact denotes a family of non-equivalent sociotechnical trajectories that differ along structurally decisive dimensions, most notably the topology and locus of technological control. I argue that at least two distinct attractors can be identified: a centralized technology gravity well, characterized by concentrated control, high coordination efficiency, and structural lock-in; and a decentralized technology gravity well, characterized by distributed agency, protocol-mediated coordination, and ongoing institutional plasticity. These futures are not reliably distinguishable using first-order descriptive discourse about abundance, automation, or human fulfillment. As a result, arguments routinely commit type errors by sliding between incompatible assumptions while preserving surface-level phenomenology. To address this failure mode, the paper introduces a second-order scientific framework for strongly typing sociotechnical futures. This framework specifies invariants, governance fields, and recursion-robust disambiguation constraints that future-oriented claims must satisfy in order to remain coherent under adversarial reformulation. The central thesis is that meaningful evaluation of "Deep Utopia"-style futures requires an upgrade of our collective reasoning infrastructure from first-order scenario description to second-order conceptual and institutional tooling. Without such infrastructure, debates about post-scarcity meaning, safety, and governance remain systematically underdetermined.