Military Responsibility for Overseas Interests Security: OSINT Audit Conducting MIL-ORR-5 Computable Closed-Loop Assessment of Dual Responsibilities (External-Internal) Under the Framework of the Overall National Security Concept —Taking the January 2026 Crisis Window in Venezuela as an Example

This paper undertakes an OSINT accountability audit strictly constrained by publicly verifiable evidence. Its objective is to provide a verifiable, falsifiable, and tiered audit conclusion regarding the Chinese military's external responsibilities (security provision and credibility stabilisation within a partnership context) and internal responsibilities (obligations to safeguard overseas security for its citizens, institutions, and critical assets) concerning the security of China's overseas interests in Venezuela, without invoking any non-public information. The study anchors the boundaries of publicly committed Sino-Venezuelan relations using multilingual authoritative primary sources. Centred on the January 2026 crisis window period, it proposes the MIL-ORR-5 Overseas Interest Security Supply Closed-Loop Audit System, providing scoring methodologies and computable algorithms. This transforms the assessment of ‘duty fulfilment’ from retrospective attribution to a window-period mechanism output audit. Calculations reveal: within current OSINT-verifiable parameters, state-level diplomatic and financial regulatory actions exhibit clear visibility. However, the military's external-internal security provision loop lacks publicly verifiable evidence meeting the ‘minimum auditable threshold,’ constituting an attributable gap of ‘insufficient mechanism auditability.’ Concurrently, crisis windows significantly amplify credibility pressures on partnerships, yet no symmetrical signals of stable ‘boundary interpretation-credibility management’ mechanisms are discernible in the public domain, creating ‘suspicions of substandard cross-departmental lock-in and credibility management.’ Regarding specific military-technical system conclusions such as ‘air defence system failures,’ existing public materials are insufficient to form a performance-level evidence chain, precluding escalation to hard accountability for technical negligence. This paper concludes by proposing a rectification pathway achieving minimal closed-loop visibility without disclosing sensitive capability details, thereby meeting auditable governance requirements for overseas interests security.