Security Threats in Telecom Networks by Prompt Poisoning of MCP Servers and Mitigations

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Authors: Binu Kiliamkavunkal Govindan
Cited by: 0

Abstract

The communication sector experiences the most security challenges ever because artificial intelligence agents are integrated into the network functioning, customer service, and administration. The use of prompt poisoning and injection attacks is one of the critical vulnerabilities that can be used to put pressure on the AI systems in understanding instructions, and potentially put the integrity of the network under question, and make sensitive customer information available. Although the Model Context Protocol offers the capability of powerful AI agents, it presents certain attack vectors, such as the lack of proper authentication protocols, broad permissions, and tool poisoning by corrupting the data sources. Such threats are reported in various fields of operation in which compromised AI agents may cause service interruptions, parasite observability systems, compromise fraud detection systems, and enable unauthorized access to customer information. The defense should be multi-layered and a combination of stringent input checking, output filtering, proper authentication, minimization of privileges, and constant monitoring of behaviors. Organizations are required to deploy Zero Trust designs that are tailored to the specific needs of AI agents, have detailed audit trails, and have fast incident response strategies that identify and limit compromises. With the development of telecommunications networks to achieve complete autonomy where AI agents gain greater powers, the intelligence layer faces as much risk as physical infrastructure, and it requires urgent consideration by security leaders and long-term dedication to best practices.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning Network Security and Intrusion Detection Cybersecurity and Information Systems

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
31 January 2026