Case study: Anti-European disinformation in Ukraine during the Euromaidan period and the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine

In the information sphere, domestic elites also drive disinformation. The study shows that disinformation is domestically produced, locally adapted, and strategically targeted, even when foreign actors provide content or amplification. Serbia illustrates this mechanism: leaders frame protests as “Western-orchestrated coloured revolutions” for internal audiences while presenting students’ protests externally as pro-Russian manipulation—two contradictory narratives deployed to maximise political gains. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ruling elites in Republika Srpska blend ethnonationalist and pro-Kremlin messaging to weaken state authority. In Georgia, the government-backed campaign around the “foreign agents law” portrays Western partners as destabilising actors. Ukraine represents a contrasting case, where civil society and state institutions have built comparatively effective information-resilience structures. Across cases, patrons use disinformation to delegitimise opposition, reshape public perceptions of foreign partners, and present different narratives to different audiences. Foreign sponsors—especially Russia—offer templates and amplification, but domestic elites remain the central translators and deployers. The same actors who negotiate corrosive deals often rely on disinformation to defend them, presenting criticism as “foreign pressure” and portraying China, Russia, or Turkey as pragmatic partners. Material and narrative influence reinforce each other, creating a cycle of dependency that shields elites from accountability. The study also highlights actors of resistance: independent media exposing procurement abuses; civil society groups tracking environmental and social impacts; local communities mobilising against destructive mining or energy projects; fact-checking organisations documenting coordinated disinformation campaigns; and anti-corruption bodies that occasionally resist political capture. These counterweights show that corrosive practices face pushback and that policy interventions can strengthen oversight. *This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement No 101132692. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.