Agency Heterogeneous Intentionality: How Corporate Structure Transforms Moral Agents into Optimization Outputs

This paper demonstrates how corporate structure architecturally transforms moral agents into optimization outputs. Individuals enter corporations as Level 3 intentional systems capable of moral reasoning, shame, and reciprocity. Corporate architecture systematically strips these capacities, producing Level 1 optimization engines that calculate expected value without moral constraint. The transformation is not accidental but architectural. Corporate law creates formal separation between individual moral agency and corporate decision-making. Fiduciary duties mandate profit maximization. Liability shields protect individual decision-makers. Information systems aggregate only payoff-relevant data. The result: corporations cannot form mens rea because they lack the neural architecture required for moral agency. Drawing on Dennett's intentional stance framework and game-theoretic analysis, the paper demonstrates three claims: First, heterogeneous intentionality is architecturally embedded in corporate form. Second, this explains systematic enforcement failures across multiple regulatory regimes. Third, effective corporate governance requires mechanisms designed for Level 1 intentional systems, not moral agents.