(ACAB) When Coercion Becomes Constitutive: Normative Addressability and the Limits of Institutional Justification

This paper develops a structural account of moral justification and argues that contemporary political philosophy underestines a fundamental distinction between instrumental and constitutive coercion. While standard justificatory frameworks evaluate coercion in terms of proportionality, necessity, and accountability, this article argues that such standards presuppose a condition of normative addressability: those subject to coercion must remain capable of refusing, contesting, or exiting without catastrophic loss. Where refusal predictably entails non-refusable harm—harm that collapses the functional conditions of agency—justificatory discourse loses application. Coercion ceases to be a tool and becomes a constitutive condition of institutional operation. In such cases, moral justification does not merely fail; it becomes structurally unavailable. The paper develops the concept of normative addressability, distinguishes instrumental from constitutive coercion, and applies the framework to contemporary policing. It argues that reformist defenses fail because they leave intact the standing possibility of non-refusable harm as a compliance mechanism. The conclusion is structural rather than moralistic: institutions retaining constitutive coercion operate beyond the domain in which justification retains meaning. The argument engages with Rawlsian public justification, Scanlonian contractualism, and republican non-domination, clarifying a shared but under-theorized presupposition within these traditions.