What Makes a Thing a Thing? Conditional Stabilization as the Ontological Ground of Object Identity
Abstract
What is an object, and what allows it to persist through change? Classical philosophy offers divergent answers: Aristotle analyzes objects through categorical determinations such as quality and quantity; Buddhist philosophy emphasizes conditional origination and impermanence; phenomenology treats objects as stable unities of experience; and modern science models systems as dynamically maintained structures. This paper integrates these traditions into a unified ontological framework in which objects are understood as conditionally stabilized unities. An object is defined as a substance (οὐσία) determined along multiple axes—including quality (ποιόν), quantity (ποσόν), relation (πρός τι), spatial and temporal location (ποῦ, πότε), configuration (κεῖσθαι), and state (πάθος)—whose existence unfolds through three fundamental processes: genesis (γένεσις), transformation (μεταβολή), and dissolution (φθορά). Crucially, these processes are governed by causes (αἰτία) operating under enabling conditions (συνθήκη). This framework reconceives object identity not as static essence but as conditional invariance across structured transformations. By unifying categorical determination, causal conditionality, and dynamical persistence, the proposed model offers a cross-tradition ontology capable of explaining object identity across physical, cognitive, and phenomenological domains.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Classical Philosophy and Thought
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Publication details
- Journal / source
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
- Publication date
- 17 February 2026
- Language
- EN