Judge Hercules And Laplace's Demon: Philosophical and Practical Limits of Predictive Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Decision-Making

Recent advances in artificial intelligence have renewed interest in predictive models of judicial decision-making, raising questions about determinism, legal rationality, and the possibility of overcoming uncertainty in law. This article examines whether contemporary AI-based predictive systems revive idealized models of legal determinacy, drawing on Dworkin’s Judge Hercules and Laplace’s Demon as theoretical reference points. Through a conceptual and comparative analysis grounded in legal theory, philosophy of science, and socio-legal research, the article traces the historical development of predictive models and evaluates their cognitive, epistemological, and systemic limits. It argues that predictive accuracy, even when surpassing human expertise in specific tasks, does not transform law into a deterministic system. Instead, predictive models generate probabilistic expectations rooted in past decisions and conditioned by temporal, institutional, and social dynamics. By situating artificial intelligence within the structural uncertainty of law, the article shows that AI may enhance consistency while leaving indeterminacy intact, unaltered overall.