EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY: E. STEIN AND R. INGARDEN

The article attempts to respond to Heidegger's reproach against Husserl for the lack of proper study of the question of being within the framework of phenomenology. To do this, we make a brief bibliographic digression, referring to Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", where Husserl outlines his project of "pure logic", and the third "Logical Study", which contains a draft of formal ontology. Turning to the specifics of the formal ontology, we consider it in conjunction with material ontology, clarifying the essential differences between one ontological system and another. Based on this, we draw the primary conclusion that for Husserl to exist is to be one of the mereological constants, a part or a whole. Husserl's position on the question of the meaning of being was developed by his direct students, primarily E. Stein and R. Ingarden. Each of them, while maintaining the basic appearance of Husserl's ontological studies, offered his own alternative to the project of the master of classical phenomenology, focusing on existential motives in formal ontology, which in the future will allow us to move from considering formal ontology as one of the subspecies of ontological systems to formal ontology as meta-ontology.