Why AI Cannot Democratize Artistic Practice: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Botto Project

This article critically examines the claim that generative AI systems will democratize artistic practice. I argue that this claim rests on two interrelated assertions: first, that AI-generated outputs can be classified as artworks; and second, that engaging with these outputs constitutes participation in a transformed yet continuous artistic practice. I demonstrate that the first claim requires philosophical commitments to strict formalism and post-structuralism, which AI proponents implicitly or explicitly endorse. I argue that, although these commitments make the first claim plausible, they render the two assertions jointly untenable. Thus, ascribing the status of artwork to AI outputs under these commitments is incompatible with maintaining artistic practice as a norm- governed social institution. The article opens by problematizing the current debate’s focus on creativity, arguing that creativity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for something to qualify as an artwork. I then examine Margaret Boden’s adaptation of the Turing Test for art, which foregrounds perceptual indistinguishability and aesthetic properties while omitting creativity, thereby supporting my argument implicitly. As a central case study, I analyze the Botto project and the developers’ claim that it will democratize artistic practice, rendering categories such as artist, curator, public, and artwork obsolete. I make explicit the philosophical commitments to formalism and post-structuralism behind the project, arguing that these positions expose artistic practice to radical relativism, thus undermining its coherence. I contend that Botto’s recent turn toward a programmed personality provides compelling evidence in support of my argument, as it tacitly concedes that artistic practice cannot be sustained without the artist.