Intentional Inflation: A Theory of Strategic Inference and Epistemic Escalation.

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Authors: François MAILLOT
Cited by: 0

Abstract

This repository contains the complete replication package associated with the article "Intentional Inflation." The package includes the theoretical manuscript (PDF), the operational calibration protocol, and a self-contained Python script for the simulation suite. The paper develops a formal framework for analyzing how analysts infer adversarial intentions from ambiguous behavior in international politics. While existing research in international relations has extensively studied signaling, misperception, and commitment problems, it rarely specifies a formal rule governing when escalation in intentional attribution is epistemically justified. The article introduces a hierarchical model of strategic inference distinguishing between declarations, operational signals, and observable effects. By formalizing a burden-of-proof constraint, the framework identifies a distinct class of systemic analytical errors in strategic assessment. It derives a principle of inferential parsimony stating that expanded intentional hypotheses require discriminatory evidence that is operationally independent from the primary observable effects. The repository provides the simulation code used to illustrate the "inflation region" within the parameter space. These materials allow independent researchers to reproduce the figures and explore alternative parameter configurations.

Fields of Study & Subjects

International Relations and Foreign Policy Intelligence Security War Strategy European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
6 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint