Physical-Layer Containment via Isochronous Governors: An Information-Theoretic Side-Channel Countermeasure

Non-deterministic computation—whether from neural networks, speculative execution, or legacy system architectures—inevitably leaks information via timing side-channels, bypassing cryptographic isolation and air gaps. We propose a hardware-enforced containment architecture, Project BLACKBODY, which treats the compute node as a high-entropy thermodynamic source. By interposing a unidirectional, isochronous Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) governor between the secure zone and the operator, we physically clamp the channel capacity (C) to ≤ 1200 bits per second. We demonstrate through information theory that limiting the rate of information egress below the human cognitive processing threshold mathematically bounds the system's "Agency" (α), rendering high-velocity exfiltration, covert timing attacks, and real-time manipulation thermodynamically impossible.