From the Question of Existence to the Conditions of Determination: Reconstructing "Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?" in MARP

This paper argues that the classical formulation of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” rests on a false symmetry between “something” and “nothing.” In its standard metaphysical form, the question treats both terms as if they were equally available explanatory alternatives and then asks why one obtains rather than the other. Against this framing, I develop a reconstruction of the problem from within MARP (Metaphysics of the Absolute and Reference Points). On this view, judgment does not begin from an absolute standpoint but from a point of reference: a structured condition under which differentiation, attribution, and intelligibility become possible. What appears as certainty, stability, or presence is therefore not evidence of an unconditioned absolute, but the effect of highly stabilized referential configurations. On this basis, unity is reinterpreted not as an ontological primitive but as an operational consequence of determination, while determination itself is understood not as an object before judgment but as the condition of possibility of judgment. The central claim is that “nothing” fails to qualify as a genuine explanatory alternative to “something,” because it lacks the conditions of determination, reference, and inferential support required for comparison. The question of existence must therefore be reformulated: not why being was selected over nothingness, but how determination becomes possible such that something can appear at all.