CEPA, Trade Gains, and the Distribution of Labour Returns: Evidence from India, 2021-2024

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Authors: Ahan Dasgupta
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Abstract

The India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which entered into force on 1 May 2022, generated substantial export growth in India’s gems and jewellery sector, an industry employing over 270,000 registered factory workers and an estimated five million workers across the formal and informal economy combined. A prior Bayesian analysis (Authors, 2025, working paper) established a posterior probability of approximately 0.79 that CEPA generated a meaningful positive trade effect in sectors where tariff concessions were deepest, of which gems and jewellery is the most significant. This paper extends that finding by asking a question that aggregate trade metrics cannot answer: did export-driven sectoral growth translate into improved income security for workers, or did the distributional structure of the industry concentrate gains among capital owners while workers’ share of value declined? Drawing on three rounds of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) microdata for 2021–22, 2022–23, and 2023–24, and deflating for Consumer Price Index growth of approximately 11% over the observation period, we calculate the labour share of gross value added (GVA) and compare real wage growth against sectoral value creation. We find that while nominal gross value added grew by 36.9% between 2021–22 and 2023–24, average real wages per worker declined by approximately 5.9% against a 2021–22 base. Labour’s share of GVA declined from 43.1% to a trough of 39.5% in 2022–23 before partially recovering to 40.8% in 2023–24, remaining persistently below the pre-CEPA baseline. Of the Rs 7,108 crore in incremental value added over the period, workers captured approximately 34.3%, compared to their 43.1% share of total sectoral GVA in the pre-CEPA baseline—an 8.8 percentage point shortfall in the marginal distribution relative to the baseline average. These findings are descriptive and do not establish a causal link between CEPA and the observed distributional pattern; alternative explanations including commodity price movements, post-COVID demand recovery, and structural capital-labour substitution trends cannot be excluded without a comparison group and longer pre-treatment series. Nonetheless, the distributional pattern is consistent with the structural political economy of CEPA’s negotiation: the Gems and Jewellery Export Promotion Council (GJEPC) was the dominant sectoral interlocutor in the Ministry of Commerce’s negotiating process, while no formal labour representation mechanism existed. This institutional asymmetry, reinforced by India’s piece-rate employment structure in Surat’s diamond polishing clusters and the incomplete implementation of the four Labour Codes, created conditions under which export revenue gains accrued disproportionately to exporting firms and capital. The paper argues that trade agreements whose gains are structurally concentrated generate conditions that historically undermine political support for further liberalisation, as India’s RCEP withdrawal illustrated.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Global trade and economics Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Economic Theory and Policy

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
21 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint