Constraint as the Ground of Quantum Structure: Heisenberg Uncertainty and the Pauli Exclusion Principle from a Constraint-Theoretic Ontology

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Authors: Paul D Prideaux
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Abstract

Two of the most fundamental structural features of quantum mechanics — the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Pauli exclusion principle — are standardly treated as posits: brute facts about the physical world that quantum theory describes but does not explain. This paper argues that both receive principled ontological grounding from Constraint Theory (CT), the thesis established by transcendental argument that constraint is the ontological primitive constitutive of determinate existence as such. On the CT account, determinate physical entities are constituted by their constraint profiles — the specific exclusion relations that individuate them from everything they are not. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is shown to reflect the conjugate structure of quantum constraint topology: position-space constraint and momentum-space constraint are dual expressions of a single underlying constraint structure, related by Fourier duality, such that closing one dimension of possibility space structurally requires opening the conjugate dimension. The Pauli exclusion principle is shown to be the direct physical expression of CT’s foundational claim that to be is to exclude: fermions are individuated through mutual exclusion, and the impossibility of two fermions occupying the same quantum state is the ontological requirement that distinct entities must differ in their constraint profiles. The fermion/boson distinction is given a unified structural interpretation: fermions are entities individuated by state-exclusion; bosons are entities whose mode of individuation does not proceed through state-exclusion. The paper engages the principal interpretive positions in the philosophy of quantum mechanics and the literature on quantum particle individuality, and argues that the CT account provides explanatory depth that these positions presuppose but do not supply.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Quantum Mechanics and Applications Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic and Philosophy of Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
21 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint