Cryptographic Observation Attestation Inside a BGP Routing Daemon: Experimental Validation of VIRP

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Authors: Nathan Howard
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Abstract

This paper presents experimental results from a liveimplementation of the Verified Infrastructure ResponseProtocol (VIRP) embedded directly within FRRouting’sBGP daemon (bgpd). Unlike external monitoring sys-tems that observe network state after the fact, the VIRPbgpd module hooks into the routing daemon’s finitestate machine and RIB processing pipeline, producingHMAC-SHA256 signed observations at the exact mo-ment BGP events fire—inside the daemon’s own pro-cess space. We document two controlled experiments—a BGP peer flap and a route origin hijack simulation—conducted on a 35-router GNS3 topology spanning 13autonomous systems. All observations were crypto-graphically verified by an independent O-Node receiver.Results demonstrate that VIRP produces tamper-evident,nanosecond-timestamped audit trails of BGP state tran-sitions, route announcements, withdrawals, and best-path changes, with automatic trust tier classification atthe source. These results validate the claims in IETFInternet-Draft draft-howard-virp-03 and establish VIRP as a viable protocol-layer trust primitive for automated

Fields of Study & Subjects

Network Security and Intrusion Detection Cybersecurity and Information Systems Security and Verification in Computing

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
22 March 2026
Language
EN