Knowing Without Foundations: A Materialist Critique of Classical Rationalism

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Authors: David Cota
Cited by: 0
References: 3

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Abstract

This essay examines a presupposition shared by Descartes and Spinoza, namely that genuine knowledge requires an absolute foundation, and argues that this demand is structurally misconceived. The architectural metaphor sustaining epistemological foundationalism imposes upon knowledge three presuppositions it does not in fact satisfy: linear temporality, systemic unity, and the global propagation of failure. A genealogical analysis shows that Cartesian foundationalism is inseparable from a secularised theological horizon, within which mind–body dualism is the condition of the problem of justification, not its consequence. Spinozist monism dissolves the Cartesian gulf but preserves the foundationalist structure, displacing the absolute from transcendent God to immanent Substance, at the cost of eliminating contingency, genuine novelty, and historical openness. In its place, an emergentist materialist epistemology is proposed: reason is a symbolic reorganisation of matter, historically reinscribed and validated through operative practices, requiring neither transcendence nor any reflection of eternal order. Knowledge is validated without prior guarantee because reason does not begin: it reorganises. It operates through historical coherence, correcting itself in confrontation with the real without ever arriving at ultimate foundations. Truth is independent of the access we have to it; revision is significant precisely because the real does not yield to our descriptions of it.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Publication details

Journal / source
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
Publication date
24 March 2026
Language
EN