URB #510 — The Unavoidable Embedding Theorem: No Neutral Philosophical Position Exists

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Authors: Brandon Charles Emerick
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Abstract

We prove the **Unavoidable Embedding Theorem (UET)**: for any foundational philosophical question encountered repeatedly across a human lifetime, the probability of a genuinely neutral prior approaches zero. Claimed neutrality on such questions is not the absence of a position but rather a **Double Tralse Type 3** error (Self-Refuting Meta-Statement): a claim of indeterminacy that is itself determinate. Philosophical priors are installed through lived experience long before formal philosophical inquiry begins. By the time a person consciously encounters the "free will debate," they have already voted on it hundreds of times through their attributions of praise, blame, regret, and effort. We distinguish three epistemic states — **Recognized Commitment** (TRUE/FALSE), **Unexamined Commitment** (MR_PEND), and **Claimed Neutrality** (Double Tralse Type 3) — and argue that genuine philosophical inquiry requires prior extraction before evaluation. The TI Sigma implication: authentic LCC scoring demands surfacing embedded priors, because unrecognized commitments bias coherence measurement from within.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Philosophical Thought and Analysis Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
25 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint