Cooperation vs Speculation in Financial Markets: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Systemic Stability

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Authors: Martín Fuertes Oliva
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Abstract

Financial markets are traditionally driven by competitive dynamics and short-termprofit maximization. However, this paradigm may contribute to systemic instability,increased volatility, and negative externalities in the real economy, including environ-mental degradation and social inequality. This paper explores an alternative frameworkbased on cooperative investment strategies, where investors prioritize long-term valuecreation over short-term gains. Using concepts from game theory, the study models theinteraction between cooperative and speculative investors, demonstrating that while co-operation leads to globally optimal outcomes, it is inherently unstable under currentincentive structures. The paper further discusses potential regulatory and structuralmechanisms to promote cooperative equilibria and enhance systemic resilience

Fields of Study & Subjects

Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Economic theories and models Banking stability regulation efficiency

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
26 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint