Cooperation vs Speculation in Financial Markets: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Systemic Stability
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Financial markets are traditionally driven by competitive dynamics and short-termprofit maximization. However, this paradigm may contribute to systemic instability,increased volatility, and negative externalities in the real economy, including environ-mental degradation and social inequality. This paper explores an alternative frameworkbased on cooperative investment strategies, where investors prioritize long-term valuecreation over short-term gains. Using concepts from game theory, the study models theinteraction between cooperative and speculative investors, demonstrating that while co-operation leads to globally optimal outcomes, it is inherently unstable under currentincentive structures. The paper further discusses potential regulatory and structuralmechanisms to promote cooperative equilibria and enhance systemic resilience
Fields of Study & Subjects
Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
Economic theories and models
Banking stability
regulation
efficiency
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Publication date
- 26 March 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Preprint