Substrate-Invariant Safety Enforcement: A Categorical Framework for Formal Verification Across Electronic, Photonic, and Quantum Computational Architectures
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Safety enforcement across electronic, photonic and quantum systems requires a common operational contract together with substrate-specific physical assumptions. The architectural objective is a hardware enforcement boundary whose grant and actuator authority lie beyond the adaptive compute plane's declared write access. This makes physical mediation, rather than correct behaviour by that compute plane, the basis of the proposed safety architecture. We construct a history-based Safety Enforcement Functor from realised configurations and events to constraint observations. A separate physical-semantics functor distinguishes equality of composed physical maps from equality of execution histories, so a reversible process can leave a recorded safety violation even when its final state is restored. The construction admits truth loss, restoration and authorised policy changes, and has a compositional tensor for independent product preparations. Its functor laws follow from the free construction. We prove a conditional admitted-action safety theorem and check a finite abstraction exhaustively. An FPGA interlock supplies the electronic baseline, with post-route gate timing of 80 ns (four register stages at 50 MHz) for a standalone gate and 10 ns (one cycle at 100 MHz) for a redesigned gate within a five-block enforcement prototype. Photonic and quantum mechanisms are reference architectures: complex-field cancellation is paired with a final interlock and a finite fault-response envelope, while a quantum-derived decision that gates a classical actuator must cross a classical record boundary, and its measurement inference is specified separately. A reproducible computational evaluation adds exhaustive finite protocol checks, a synthetic optical operating-envelope study and repeated-readout diagnostics. The results distinguish exposure reduction from final gating, and initial-state inference from present-state safety and freshness. A finite-window refinement derives robust context margins and a continuous actuator-memory/rearm bound for nonzero-latency hardware release. Cross-substrate attestation is specified as a contract with explicit physical, statistical and cryptographic trust boundaries; its full succinct post-quantum construction remains open. The work establishes a compositional model and testable enforcement obligations, rather than physical validation of the proposed optical and quantum systems.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Formal Methods in Verification
Security and Verification in Computing
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Publication date
- 26 March 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Preprint