On the Forgery of Cicada 3301 PGP Signatures via SHA-1 Collision Attacks

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Authors: Kaoru Aguilera Katayama
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Abstract

We present a critical observation regarding the cryptographic integrity of communications attributed to Cicada 3301, the anonymous organization known for publishing complex cryptographic puzzles between 2012 and 2017. All verified Ci-cada 3301 PGP-signed messages employed SHA-1 as the digest algorithm (Hash: SHA1). Following the publication of the SHAttered attack by Stevens et al. (2017), which demonstrated practical chosen-prefix collision attacks against SHA-1, the authenticity guarantees of Cicada 3301's PGP signature scheme are fundamentally compromised. We argue that any future communication bearing the Cicada 3301 PGP signature cannot be trusted as authentic, as the signature is now practically forgeable. Notably, the final verified Cicada 3301 communication coincides temporally with the disclosure of SHAttered, suggesting possible awareness by the organization itself.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptographic Implementations and Security Cryptography and Data Security Coding theory and cryptography

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
26 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint