DISSECTING SOVEREIGN DEFAULT IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF CREDITOR COMPOSITION AND REPAYMENT HIERARCHIES
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A sovereign government generally engages with multiple creditors and retains the discretion to decide both the timing of debt repayments and the prioritization among its various creditors. This paper investigates the determinants of sovereign default in a comprehensive sample of 52 African countries over the period 1970 to 2019. Drawing on a newly constructed dataset that distinguishes sovereign default events by creditor type, we find that defaults are not uniform across creditor groups. Rather, the occurrence and nature of sovereign default are closely linked to the specific economic and financial conditions prevailing at the time, as well as to the type of creditor involved. In particular, the likelihood and context of default differ significantly depending on whether the obligations are owed to banks, bondholders, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), or other sovereign governments. Our empirical analysis further reveals that bilateral creditors are more likely to be treated as subordinate in repayment hierarchies, especially when compared to multilateral institutions and holders of sovereign bonds. These findings underscore the importance of disaggregating creditor categories when assessing sovereign risk and highlight the need for more nuanced debt management strategies, particularly within the African context where the creditor landscape is diverse and evolving.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Global Financial Crisis and Policies
Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Research
- Publication date
- 28 March 2026
- Language
- EN