Ep. 231: Can Hackers Steal Your Signal Messages by Rerouting the Internet?

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Authors: Daniel Rosehill, Gemini 3.1 (Flash), Chatterbox TTS
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Abstract

Episode summary: Most users think of the internet as a direct line, but it's actually a fragile web of over 90,000 independent networks held together by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In this episode, Herman and Corn dive into the terrifying world of BGP hijacking—a technique where governments or malicious actors "lie" to the internet to reroute traffic through their own servers. Using historical maneuvers as a case study, the duo examines whether high-security apps like Signal can truly protect your data when the underlying roads of the web are compromised. They break down the difference between message content and the "who, when, and where" of metadata, explaining why your encrypted messages might be safe while your identity remains exposed. From the technical hurdles of RPKI adoption to the rise of the "splinternet," this conversation reveals the structural vulnerabilities of our digital world. Is our global communication network built on a foundation of trust that no longer exists? Tune in to find out how the invisible infrastructure of the web defines the future of digital sovereignty and personal privacy. Show Notes ### The Fragile Foundation: Understanding BGP and the Illusion of Direct Connection In the latest episode of *My Weird Prompts*, hosts Herman Poppleberry and Corn peel back the digital curtain to examine the "nervous system" of the modern world: the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). While most users perceive the internet as a seamless, direct connection between their device and a destination, the reality is far more complex and significantly more fragile. Herman and Corn describe the internet not as a single entity, but as a massive collection of over 90,000 independent networks known as Autonomous Systems (ASes). To navigate this vast landscape, these networks rely on BGP—a protocol designed in the late 1980s. At its core, BGP is the "postal service" of the internet, allowing different networks to communicate and share the best routes for data to travel. However, as the hosts point out, this system was built on a foundation of trust during a time when the internet was a much smaller, friendlier place. This inherent trust has become one of the greatest security vulnerabilities in the 21st century. ### The Mechanics of a Hijack: Detouring the Global Traffic The central threat discussed in the episode is BGP hijacking. Because BGP lacks a built-in verification system, a network can essentially "lie" to the global routing table. By announcing that it is the most efficient path to a specific set of IP addresses—even those it doesn't own—a malicious actor or a government can trick the rest of the internet into sending traffic their way. Corn and Herman use the analogy of a rogue construction crew placing detour signs on a highway. Instead of reaching the city center, drivers are led into a secret warehouse. In a digital context, this means that traffic intended for a secure server in the United States or Europe could be routed through a government-controlled gateway in a completely different country. Using historical technical maneuvers in regions like Iran as a case study, the hosts explain how these "detours" allow state actors to intercept, observe, or even "blackhole" (delete) traffic at a national scale. ### Encryption vs. Infrastructure: Is Signal Still Safe? The conversation then pivots to a critical question: if your traffic is hijacked, does end-to-end encryption still protect you? To answer this, Herman distinguishes between the content of a message and the metadata surrounding it. For users of high-security apps like Signal, there is some good news. Signal utilizes the Double Ratchet Algorithm, ensuring that messages are encrypted on the sender's device and only decrypted by the recipient. Even if a government hijacks the BGP route and intercepts the data packets, they only see "scrambled gibberish." Herman also explains a secondary defense: certificate pinning. While an attacker might attempt a "man-in-the-middle" attack by providing a fake security certificate, apps like Signal are hard-coded to recognize only the real certificates from their own servers. If the app detects a mismatch, it refuses to connect, preventing the user from inadvertently handing over decrypted content. ### The Metadata Vulnerability: Seeing the Silhouette While the content of the message might remain secure, the hosts warn that the metadata is a different story. Metadata—the "who, what, and where" of a connection—remains visible to the entity controlling the hijacked BGP route. "You are essentially seeing the silhouette of the conversation, even if you cannot hear the words," Herman explains. By monitoring the flow of traffic, an interceptor can see which IP addresses are communicating, the frequency of messages, and the size of the data being exchanged. In a geopolitical context, this information is often more than enough to identify dissidents, map out social movements, or target specific individuals for further surveillance. The metadata provides the context that encryption cannot hide, turning a BGP hijack into a powerful tool for state-level social mapping. ### The Rise of the "Splinternet" and the Future of RPKI As the episode draws to a close, Herman and Corn discuss the industry's attempt to fix these legacy vulnerabilities. The primary solution is Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a system that allows network owners to cryptographically sign their BGP announcements. This "digital ID card" would theoretically make hijacking impossible. However, the hosts highlight a significant hurdle: adoption. Many networks are slow to implement RPKI due to the risk of breaking connectivity, and some governments have little incentive to adopt technology that limits their ability to control domestic traffic. This tension is leading to what experts call the "splinternet"—a fragmentation of the global web into different regions with varying levels of security and government interference. Ultimately, the discussion serves as a sobering reminder of the internet's structural fragility. We have built a sophisticated digital civilization on a routing protocol that still operates on the honor system. As state actors become more adept at manipulating these invisible roads, the battle for digital privacy will move beyond the apps on our phones and into the very fabric of the network itself. Listen online: https://myweirdprompts.com/episode/bgp-hijacking-internet-security-risks

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies Cybersecurity and Information Systems Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting

Publication details

Journal / source
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Publication date
15 January 2026
Language
EN