Evoluism and the Structural Collapse of Strong Universal Theories

This article argues that any strong universal theory is structurally defective. A strong universal theory, as understood here, is any theoretical framework that claims universal validity for a single descriptive structure, set of distinctions, or regime of articulation, and thereby aspires to articulate Reality as such. From the standpoint of Evoluism, this ambition is illegitimate. A world is a local regime of manifestness in which differences are retained, stabilised, and made available for coordination, description, and explanation. Reality, by contrast, is not an entity, structure, or process within such a regime, but the limit-condition of the applicability of ontological categories. The article develops a structural dilemma: any strong universal theory must either identify Reality with one regime of manifestness or extend its distinctions beyond the conditions that sustain their validity. In both cases, the constitutive asymmetry between condition, regime, and element collapses. The paper distinguishes weak unification from strong theoretical totalisation and argues that explanatory scope does not license universal ontological closure. It situates this conclusion within the broader Evoluist framework concerning the limits of ontology, the domain dependence of distinctions, and the structural impossibility of invariant recovery under collapsing transitions.