Cartographic Ignorance and Imperial Failure: Knowledge Asymmetry and the Scottish Darién Scheme, 1695–1707

Abstract This article argues that the primary cause of the Scottish colonial failure at Darién (1698–1700) was a systemic knowledge asymmetry between the Company of Scotland and its competitors. Whereas previous scholarship has emphasized diplomatic obstruction, environmental misfortune, and managerial incompetence, this study foregrounds the epistemological dimension of the disaster: the Scots' deliberate reliance on outdated cartographic materials, their rejection of available corrective intelligence, and their competitors’ superior command of actionable geographic knowledge. Drawing on primary sources including colonial journals, Company correspondence, and contemporary maps, and engaging with the historiographical traditions from Barbour and Insh through Gallup-Diaz and Jajdelska, the article advances a framework of "production knowledge" (the gathering of geographic and environmental information) versus "execution knowledge" (the strategic deployment of that information) to illuminate how epistemic failure, compounded by cultural hubris and motivated reasoning, rendered the Darién enterprise improbable from its inception. Particular attention is paid to the Scots' cartographic record, the intelligence capacities of the Spanish and English crowns, and the underexplored role of the Kuna as sophisticated information actors. The article concludes that the Darién catastrophe offers a paradigmatic case study in how knowledge asymmetry shapes the outcomes of early modern imperial competition. Preprint. Revised version. Submitted for peer review at the Scottish Historical Review.